Hamas simply shut down when it came into contact with one of the world’s most advanced monitoring systems.
Israel’s national security apparatus was utterly unprepared for the extremist group’s onslaught on Saturday, which is startling considering the extent of the incursion, which encompassed attacks by sea, air, and land and pushed deep into Israeli territory.
It shouldn’t have been conceivable, in theory. The reputation of Israel’s intelligence agencies as among of the most advanced in the world exists. And one of the most watched areas on earth is the Gaza Strip, a small area of land bordering to Egypt. They tap phone lines. Satellites scan the sky. In a region somewhat more than twice the size of Washington, DC, informants monitor the 2 million citizens.
Years will be needed for Israel and the US to sort through all the flaws that permitted Hamas to act so unexpectedly and with such horrific results, murdering hundreds of Israelis and kidnapping others. But according to current and former intelligence officials in the US, Israel, and other countries, a picture of how the group’s warriors did it has already started to take shape.
While many aspects remain unresolved, it is certain that Hamas adopted a low-tech strategy to evade Israeli efforts to intercept its communications and, possibly, to take advantage of the Israeli Defense Forces’ belief that its missile strikes could be stopped or repulsed.
According to Beth Sanner, a former deputy director of national intelligence, “my suspicion is that Hamas was able to keep such a vast operation – which included many, many trainers, lots of operational training, and bringing in a vast amount of munitions – close-hold because they went very old school.”
“I suspect they never talked about it electronically,” Sanner stated. “They divided it into cells and held private discussions. And various tasks were given to each group. Very few people were able to comprehend how each part of the strategy fit together as a whole.
Around 1,000 Hamas fighters smashed through the highly developed fence built to defend against threats from Gaza as dawn broke on Saturday, spreading out across towns and villages. Parents saw shootings of children. They dragged hostages out of their houses. As further fighters entered the nation using paragliders, thousands of rockets were raining down overhead.
According to a person with knowledge of Israeli intelligence operations, the attack’s success indicates that Hamas’ leadership was not well covered by the military intelligence of the nation, which is in charge of overseeing developments in Gaza.
According to Andrew Borene, an executive director of Flashpoint and a former group chief at the US National Counterterrorism Center, it’s also probable that the group’s planning included encrypted technology. “I have a feeling there is also a component of clandestine communications using devices,” he stated.
It is evident that Hamas has managed to evade Israel’s capacity to intercept phone and email communication, according to Alon Arvatz, a former member of Israel’s Unit 8200, which is in charge of the military’s signals intelligence. This encompasses some of the “perception techniques” Israel has employed in the past, some of which, according to him, may have been based on computers, phones, or other interceptable devices.
“They obviously learned how the intelligence is being collected, and they learn how to avoid it,” Arvatz stated.
literal underground
Going underground – literally – may have helped Hamas thwart Israel’s monitoring satellites, if keeping its communications secret helped the organization avoid eavesdropping.
According to a person familiar with US information on the organization, Hamas has long excelled at concealing its weapons caches underground or in tunnels. Israel has repeatedly attempted to destroy its above-ground stores from the air, but to no avail, the source claimed.
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The attack’s execution appears to have benefited from the tunnels. “They chose the alternative of digging up to the obstacle and then popping out by surprise,” said Israeli military analyst Eado Hecht. Israel constructed a sensor-equipped underground wall in 2021. “They sent a mass attack that overwhelmed the system beyond its capacity to react quickly enough.”
Hamas’ ability to plan was likely aided by the development of its own intelligence network. According to a May 2023 report published in the journal “Intelligence and National Security,” its capabilities have significantly increased since it seized control of Gaza in 2007.
Tactical Communications
The organization’s Military Intelligence Department has invested a lot of money in keeping an eye on Israel’s border, sending spies there, and listening in on tactical conversations from the Israeli Defense Forces. As a result, the report claims that Hamas has acquired information about Israeli military equipment, training programs, and troop deployments.
Hamas “had very good intelligence that the Israeli border was lightly manned, that it could be overrun, that they would be able to get close enough to detonate explosives and get through the fences, wires, and checkpoints – that’s the key,” said Kenneth Katzman, the former top Middle East expert for the Congressional Research Service. Hamas would have had access to all of this information to “map out this type of assault,” he claimed.
It’s also important to consider Israel’s own failings in comparison to Hamas’ capacity to organize the strike and conceal its goals.
There are accusations against the Israeli government that internal strife distracted its national security establishment. Many Israelis have been protesting against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s attempts to weaken the country’s judiciary for months.
The Times of Israel reported on Monday that despite repeated warnings from Egyptian intelligence that Hamas was preparing “something big,” Israeli officials decided to concentrate on the West Bank rather than Gaza. That reporting has not been independently verified by Bloomberg News.
Israel might have been overconfident as a result of its advanced technological capabilities lulling it into a false feeling of security. Exclusive: The IDF’s Capability to Strike Rockets Before They Are Launched was the title of an article the Israeli Air Force published on its website two years ago.
The scenario described in the article did not occur on Saturday when Israel’s air defenses were overrun by thousands of Hamas missiles. The IDF killed “hundreds of terrorists who were caught firing rockets at Israel” during the 2014 Gaza battle against Hamas. According to the paper, “many of them were hit just before launching, while others were attacked after the act.
As a result of failing to foresee the prospect, Israel also appears to have misjudged the intentions, motives, and capabilities of Hamas.